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Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT-IN
PRESCRIBING PERMISSIBLE LIMITS FOR EMPLOYEE ExPOsURE TO COKE
OVEN EMISSIONS SECRETARY OF LABOR WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO
PLACE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY ON EMPLOYERS TO RESEARCH AND DE-
VELOP NEW TECHNOLOGY TO MEET THOSE LIMITS.
American Iron & Steel
Institute v. Occupational Safety
& Health Administration (1978)
Several coke manufacturers and their trade associations filed petitions
for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,1
challenging a health standard promulgated by the Secretary of Labor
(Secretary) pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act).2 The
standard established certain controls and procedures to reduce employee ex-
posure to toxic coke oven emissions 3 to a specified maximum limit.4 Addi-
tionally, if the prescribed controls did not reduce emission concentrations to
the permissible limit, employers were required to provide respirators and to
research, develop, and implement any other engineering and work practice
controls necessary to curtail excess emissions. 5
1. American Iron and Steel Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 577 F.2d
825, 827 (3d Cir. 1978). For the names of the manufacturers and trade associations involved in
this action, see id. at 827 n. 1.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). Judicial review of a standard issued by the Secretary is
provided for under § 6(f) of the Act. Id. § 655(f). See generally notes 30-43 and accompanying
text infra.
Under the Act, the Secretary of Labor is charged with primary responsibility for developing
occupational safety and health standards. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1976). In practice, however, he
has delegated this function to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health, 36 Fed. Reg. 8,754 (1971), who is the chief administrative officer of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Id. References to the Secretary, the Assistant Sec-
retary, and OSHA are hereinafter used interchangeably to refer to the federal administrative
authority charged with responsibility for developing and enforcing occupational safety and health
standards under the Act.
3. 577 F.2d at 827. Coke, which is used by steel manufacturers as a fuel in blast furnaces
and foundries, is produced by the destructive distillation of coal in a coke oven battery. Id. at
828.
The hazards to coke oven employees stem from the escape, during the coking process, of
volatile gases, which contain numerous hydrocarbons and at times also include particulate mat-
ters and tars. Id. at 829.
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(c) (1977). The standard requires employers to insure that no
employee in the regulated area is exposed to coke oven emissions at concentrations greater than
0. 15 milligrams of the benzene soluble fraction of total particulate matter (BSFTPM) per cubic
meter of air (0.15 mg/m 3) present during the production of coke, averaged over an eight hour
period. Id. See 577 F.2d at 827.
For a discussion of the Department of Labor's efforts to reduce employee exposure to coke
oven emissions, see id. at 829-30.
. 5. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(f) (1977). See 577 F.2d at 827. With respect to existing coke
oven batteries, employers were required to implement specified engineering and work practice
(194)
1
Stemplewicz: Administrative Law - Occupational Safety and Health Act - In Pres
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
1978-1979] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 195
In challenging the promulgated standard, petitioners made three princi-
pal claims: 6 1) that the prescribed exposure limit was invalid under the stat-
ute because there was no substantial evidence of a health related need for
that limit and no evidence to support its feasibility; 2) that the Secretary had
exceeded his statutory authority by combining a performance standard with
specific engineering and work practice control requirements, and by requir-
ing employers to conduct open ended research to develop any necessary
control technology to curtail emissions above the prescribed limit; and 3)
that there was no substantial evidence to support the various mandated con-
trols and procedures. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit" rejected all
but one of petitioners' principal claims, denying the petition and affirming
the coke oven emissions standard with exceptions.9 The court held, inter
controls as soon as possible, but not later than January 20, 1980, except to the extent that they
could establish that such controls were not feasible. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029 (f)(1)(i)(a) (1977). If
after implementing the specified controls, or after January 20, 1980, whichever was sooner, the
permissible exposure limit were still exceeded, employers were required to research, develop,
and implement any other engineering and work practice controls necessary to reduce exposure
to or below the permissible limit, except to the extent that they could establish that such
controls were not feasible. Id. § 1910.1029(f )(1)(i)(b). Employers were not permitted to rely
upon respirators to.achieve the permissible exposure limit except in certain temporary situations
specified in the standard. Id. § 1910.1029(g).
6. 577 F.2d at 827-28. In December 1976, the American Iron and Steel Institute and the
American Coke and Chemicals Institute applied to the Secretary for a stay of the effective date
of certain of the standard's provisions or for alternative relief. Id. at 830. When the Secretary
denied that petition in January 1977, petitioners filed a motion in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit for a stay. Id. After granting an interim stay pending decision on
the motion, the court denied the motion on February 18, 1977, and vacated the interim stay.
Id. Petition for review of the standard then followed. Id.
7. Id. at 827-28. With respect to the third claim, petitioners argued that there was no
substantial evidence to support the need for quarterly monitoring of employee exposure, for the
prescribed protective clothing and hygiene facilities, for the extent of the area to be regulated,
or for the required engineering controls and work practices. Id. at 828.
Petitioners also contended that the Secretary failed to comply with minimum due process
requirements for rulemaking by not providing adequate notice of the standard. Id. n.3. The
court found no support for this contention in the record. Id.
The court also rejected the argument of petitioner CF&I Steel Corporation that the Secre-
tary acted capriciously in adopting a nationwide coke oven standard without considering evi-
dence that environmental factors in Colorado shield CF&I's workers from the carcinogenicity of
coke oven emissions. Id. The court found a rational basis for the decision of the Secretary. Id.
Finally, Republic Steel Corporation argued in its brief that respirators should be used in an
effort to comply with the permissible exposure limit. Id. The court did not reach that argument
since the Secretary's brief conceded that respirators, although not a first choice measure for
reducing employee exposure, could be used until engineering controls and work practices were
fully implemented, or where those controls could not reduce exposure to the prescribed limit.
id.
8. The case was heard by Judges Rosenn and Higginbotham, and District Judge Van
Artsdalen of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation. Judge Rosenn wrote the opinion.
9. 577 F.2d at 841. Aside from the technology-forcing provisions, two other aspects of the
standard were not affirmed. The court struck down the provision relating to a quantitative fit
test for respirators since the Government conceded that the provision was unsupported and
would not be enforced. Id. at 839. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(g)(4)(i) (1977). The Third Circuit
also remanded the petition for review insofar as it applied to noncoke oven employers. 577 F.2d
at 840. The court expressed serious reservations concerning the Department of Labor's broad
construction of the standard's applicability to independent contractors. Id.
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alia, that the standard met the technological and economic feasibility re-
quirements of the Act, 10 but that the Secretary could not place an affirma-
tive duty on employers to research and develop new technology. 1 Ameri-
can Iron and Steel Institute v. Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (AISI).
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was enacted "to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources." 12 The
Act authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate and enforce occupa-
tional safety and health standards.' 3 It also provided the procedural 14 and
substantive framework for exercising this regulatory power upon determina-
tion that a standard should be promulgated. 15
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act established the significant substantive limi-
tations which guide the Secretary in the exercise of his rulemaking au-
thority. 16  In connection herewith, technological and economic feasibility
10. 577 F.2d at 535-37. Furthermore, the court found that the Secretary's effort to meet a
perceived health need by establishing an exposure limit to coke oven emissions was proper, id.
at 832, that the Secretary could combine a performance standard with specific required en-
gineering and work practice controls, id. at 838, and that there was substantial evidence to
support the various mandated controls and procedures. Id. at 839.
11. Id. at 838. For relevant sections of the promulgated standard, see 29 C.F.R. §1910.1029(f)(1)(i)(b), (f)(1)(ii)(b), (f)(1)(iii)(b), (f )(6)(iii) (1977).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). See generally Cohen, The Occupational Safety & Health Act:
A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 788 (1972); Morey, Mandatory Occupational
Safety and Health Standards-Some Legal Problems, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 584 (1974);
Mullins, OSHA -The Federal Government and Job Safety, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 155
(1974); Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An Overview, 4 CUM.-
SAM. L. REV. 525 (1974).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). This regulatory power extends over all businesses affecting
interstate commerce. Id. § 651(b)(3). Section 6(b) of the Act covers the promulgation, modifica-
tion, or revocation of permanent standards. Id. § 655(b). In addition, § 6(c) makes provision for
promulgation of emergency temporary standards which the Secretary may issue without notice
or a hearing, but only where needed to protect employees from grave danger from new hazards.
Id. § 655(c). The Secretary must publish a permanent standard within six months after publica-
tion of the emergency standard. Id.
14. See id. § 655. The Secretary may, at his discretion, appoint an advisory committee to
examine the particular health or safety problem and recommend a specific standard. Id.
§ 655(b)(1). Within a certain period, the Secretary must issue a standard or make a determination
that one should not be issued. Id. § 655(b)(4). In either case, he must state the reasons for the
action taken. Id. § 655(e). This statement must be sufficient to allow interested persons to know
the basis of the Secretary's determination and to prevent, in subsequent judicial review, "the
use of post hoc rationalizations that do not necessarily reflect the reasoning of the agency at the
time the standard was issued." Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98,
106 (3d Cir. 1973). The rules of procedure followed by the Secretary in promulgating, modify-
ing, or revoking standards are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1911 (1977).
15. The determination that a standard should be promulgated may be based upon informa-
tion developed by the Secretary or obtained from outside sources. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)
(1976).
16. Id. § 655(b)(5). For the text of this provision, see note 17 infra. For a detailed discussion
of the development by the federal courts of substantive limitations on the Secretary's rulemak-
ing authority, see Taylor, Reasonable Rulemaking Under OSHA: Is it Feasible?, 9 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 215 (1977).
[VOL. 24: p. 194
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requirements 17 have been of particular concern in judicial proceedings in-
volving review of OSHA standards. 18 While it seems clear that the Secre-
tary must consider technological feasibility, 19 the propriety of weighing
employee safety against economic consequences has been challenged. 20 In
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,2 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the factors entering into the Secretary's con-
clusions could properly include problems of economic feasibility. 22 The
Hodgson court, however, qualified the concept of economic feasibility to ally
fears that it would be used by recalcitrant employers or industries as a
means of avoiding the reforms contemplated by the Act. 23
This view was adopted by the Third Circuit in AFL-CIO v. Brennan.24
Brennan, which involved the Secretary's decision to eliminate a safety stan-
17. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately as-
sures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has
regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working
life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, dem-
onstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate. In addition
to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee,
other considerations shall be the latest scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the
standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws.. Whenever
practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and
of the performance desired.
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). In discussing the amendment which added this
language, Senator Dominick explained that it was not the Secretary's responsibility to set stan-
dards which would assure that "no matter what anybody was doing, the standard would protect
[the employee] for the rest of his life against any foreseeable hazard." 116 CONG. REc. 37622
(1970).
18. Section 6(f) of the Act provides:
Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this section . . .
may file a petition challenging the validity of such standard with the United States court
of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of busi-
ness, for a judicial review of such standard.
29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). See generally notes 30-43 and accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Society of the Plastics
Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
20. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
21. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Hodgson, labor unions sought review of an OSHA
standard regulating concentrations of asbestos dust in industrial workplaces. Id. at 470.
22. Id. at 477. After considering the legislative history of the feasibility requirement, the
court stated: "Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their
employers out of business-either by requiring protective devices unavailable under existing
technology or by making financial viability generally impossible." Id. at 478.
23. Id. at 478. The court stated:
It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of the Act to envisage the economic
demise of an employer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry in protecting the
health and safety of employees and is consequently financially unable to comply with new
standards as quickly as other employers.
id.
24. 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975). The Brennan court characterized an economically infeasible
standard as one which would cause "massive economic dislocation." Id. at 123. The court felt
1978-1979]
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dard for mechanical power presses, delineated the Secretary's mandate to
consider technological, as well as, economic feasibility. 25 The court held
that the Secretary could, consistent with the Act, consider technological
feasibility in formulating a standard.2 6 Relying heavily upon the Second
Circuit's decision in Society of the Plastics Industry v. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration,27 however, the Brennan court noted that the
Act must be viewed, at least to a limited extent, as a technology-forcing
piece of legislation, and that the Secretary must consider technology which
"looms on today's horizon," 28  The principal case is the first to decide the
issue of whether such "technology-forcing" considerations under the Act can
be interpreted as affirmative requirements to research and develop new
technology.2 9
Pursuant to section 6(f) of the Act, reviewing courts must dismiss chal-
lenges to OSHA standards when those standards are "supported by substan-
tial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 30 This mandate has led
to what Mr. Justice Clark has termed "the unique nature of the court's role
under OSHA." 31  Traditionally, the "substantial evidence" test 3 2 had been
that such a standard would likely be evaded by so many industry members that it would prove
to be unenforceable. Id.
25. Id. at 120-22.
26. Id. at 121.
27. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). In Society of Plastics, man-
ufacturers of vinyl chloride and related products sought review of an OSHA standard governing
employee exposure to concentrations of vinyl chloride gas. 509 F.2d at 1303. Petitioners urged
that they would never be able to reduce exposure to the permissible level through engineering
means. Id. at 1308. They argued, inter alia, that the Secretary's standard was not technologi-
cally feasible. Id. at 1303, 1308-10. Disagreeing, the court stated:
We cannot agree with petitioners that the standard is so clearly impossible of attain-
ment. It appears that they simply need more faith in their own technological poten-
tialities, since the record reveals that, despite similar predictions of impossibility regard-
ing the emergency 50 ppm standard, vast improvements were made in a matter of weeks,
and a variety of useful engineering and work practice controls have yet to be instituted.
In the area of safety, we wish to emphasize, the Secretary is not restricted by the status
quo. He may raise standards which require improvements in existing technologies or
which require the development of new technology, and he is not limited to issuing stan-
dards based solely on devices already developed.
Id. at 1309.
28. 530 F.2d at 121. Nevertheless, the court was satisfied with the Secretary's determina-
tion. Id. at 121-22. His finding that compliance with the particular safety standard at issue was
not technologically feasible in the "near future" necessarily implied, according to the court,
"consideration both of existing technological capabilities and imminent advances in the art." id.
at 122.
It has also been recognized that infeasibility may not become evident until after a good
faith effort has been made toward compliance. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 534 F.2d 541, 550 (3d Cir. 1976), noted in the Third Circuit
Review, 22 VILL. L. REv. 849 (1977).
29. But see notes 73-77 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the possibility that
the Second Circuit has also decided this issue.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976).
31. Society of Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975) (Mr. Justice Clark, United States Supreme Court, retired, sitting by designa-
tion). In Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
[VOL. 24: p. 194
5
Stemplewicz: Administrative Law - Occupational Safety and Health Act - In Pres
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
thought more appropriate for the review of formal adjudications or rulemak-
ing where fact finding methods similar to those used at trials were
employed. 33  Since OSHA standards are products of informal procedures
embodying both findings of fact and legislation of policy, however, they have
not been considered amenable to evidentiary review.34
Nevertheless, no court has read the statutory mandate of section 6(f)35
as restricting judicial review to factual determinations while affording abso-
lute deference to the Secretary's policy decisions. 36 Initially it was held that
the reviewing court had the duty to subject all of the Secretary's -findings,
both of fact and of policy, to the substantial evidence test. 37 That approach,
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) , the Third Circuit described the application of a substantial evi-
dence test to quasi-legislative informal rulemaking as "an intriguing problem which is just be-
ginning to generate what will prove to be, we suspect, an extensive literature." 503 F.2d at
1158. For an excellent survey of this problem, see Taylor, supra note 16, at 221-33.
32. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). Substantial evidence
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Id., quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
Accordingly, "it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a
verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." 340 U.S. at
477, quoting Labor Bd. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
33. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), which sets forth in
general terms the scope of judicial review of the actions of federal agencies, and, in particular,
requires that rules developed under formal procedures be supported by substantial evidence.
Id. § 706 (2)(E). Formal rulemaking involves evidentiary hearings which are adversary in nature.
29 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976). Such procedures apply when the statute which gives the agency
authority to make rules requires that they be made "on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing." Id. § 553(c). See AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 & n. 13 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
34. See Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975); AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 472-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The Hodgson court noted that the Occupational Safety and Health Act is self-contained in
the sense that it does not depend upon the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706
(1976), for specification of procedures to be followed. 499 F.2d at 472. OSHA's procedures,
however, were intended to be of the informal type authorized by the APA. See S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5204.
The standard of judicial review normally associated with informal rulemaking is the "arbitrary
and capricious" test. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). The Hodgson court stated that, under this
test, "[t]he paramount objective is to see whether the agency, given an essentially legislative
task to perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness
and irrationality in the formulation of rules for general application in the future." AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoting Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v.
Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
noted that, even under the arbitrariness standard, it is the duty of the reviewing court to con-
duct "a thorough, probing, in-depth review." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 655(l) (1976). See text accompanying note 30 supra.
36. See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1159 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (SOCMA I). The SOCMA I court noted that § 6(e) of
the Act requires that the Secretary publish a statement of reasons for his actions in the Federal
Register. 503 F.2d at 1160, citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1976). The court pointed out that since
the Secretary's actions include both findings of fact and policy determinations, the requirement
of a statement of reasons suggests that both factual and policy elements may be subjected to
judicial review. 503 F.2d at 1160.
37. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354
(2d Cir. 1973). On petition for review of an OSHA standard setting minimum lavatory require-
1978-1979]
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however, proved untenlble when courts began to review OSHA standards
dealing with the complex subject of employee exposure to carcinogenic
agents.3 8 Thereupon the D.C. Circuit enunciated a new standard of review
in Hodgson,3 9 which now seems to be the prevailing view. 40  The Hodgson
court held that the Secretary's findings of fact had to be supported by sub-
stantial evidence, but that his policy judgments need only be supported by
the finding of a rational basis for the decision. 41  In Synthetic Organic
Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Brennan (SOCMA i),42 The Third
Circuit incorporated this fact-policy distinction into a five step test for judi-
cial review of OSHA standards. 43
At the outset, the Third Circuit's panel in AISI cited SOCMA I as es-
tablishing the proper scope of review of the coke oven emissions stan-
dard. 44  Turning to the merits, the court found the Secretary's factual de-
termination that no absolutely safe level of exposure to coke oven emissions
ments for nonindustrial places of business, the court vacated the standard because the record
did not support the exact numerical requirements, although there was sufficicnt evidence to
support the setting of a standard due to a legitimate health concern. Id. at 352.
38. See Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975) (vinyl chloride); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d
1155'(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (ethyleneimine); AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (asbestos dust). See Taylor, supra note 16, at 228.
39. 499 F.2d at 475-76.
40. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Society of the Plastics Indus. v.
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Synthetic Organic Chem.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). See
Taylor, supra note 16, at 228.
41. 499 F.2d at 475-76. As Judge McGowan stated:
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when
his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course
rather than another. Where that choice purports to be based on the existence of certain
determinable facts, the Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts from
evidence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy
judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the
answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.
Id. In Hodgson, the court found that the Secretary's decision to set a relatively low permissible
limit of exposure to asbestos dust rested "on an essentially legislative policy judgment." Id. at
475.
42. 503 F.2d 1155 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
43. The five steps outlined by the court were:
(1) determining whether the Secretary's notice of proposed rulemaking adequately
informed the interested persons of the action taken;
(2) determining whether the Secretary's promulgation adequately sets forth reasons
for his action;
(3) determining whether the statement of reasons reflects consideration of factors rel-
evant under the statute;
(4) determining whether presently available alternatives were at least considered; and
(5) if the Secretary's determination is based in whole or in part on factual matters
subject to evidentiary development, whether substantial evidence in the record as a
whole supports the determination.
503 F.2d at 1160.
44. 577 F.2d at 830-31, citing Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d
1155 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
[VOL. 24: p. 194
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could be established was supported by sdbstantial evidence in the record. 4 5
Declining to consider these findings dispositive, the court then considered
whether the Secretary, in setting the lowest possible exposure limit, had
properly considered the feasibility of that limit. 4 6
In attacking these limits, petitioners had questioned the validity of the
tests relied upon by the Secretary and of the recorded data.4 7 In addition,
petitioners had argued that section 6(b)(5) requires actual technological
feasibility, and that the Secretary had placed too much faith in new and
innovative techniques. 48  The court observed, however, that the emission level
established by the Secretary was not a factual determination which would
have to be supported by substantial evidence in the record, 49 and rejected
petitioners' claims. 50
The AISI court also found that the data relied upon by the Secretary
indicated numerous instances where the exposure level had been maintained
within the permissible range, 51 and thus concluded that the Secretary's de-
termination of technological feasibility was at least a "reasoned decision." 52
Similarly, the Third Circuit upheld the exposure limit as economically feasi-
ble. 53  In spite of the virtually unchallenged claims of adverse financial im-
pact on the coke industry, 54 the court relied on Brennan 55 and determined
45. 577 F.2d at 832. Since the perceived health need was based upon factual determinations
supported by substantial evidence, the court concluded that the Secretary's effort to meet that
need by establishing an exposure limit to coke oven emissions was proper. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 833. The Secretary relied primarily on tests conducted at the U.S. Steel Corpora-
tion's plant at Fairfield, Alabama, which is considered the newest and cleanest coke oven bat-
tery operating in the United States. Id. Since only one third of the sample readings were below
the 0.15 mg/m3 BSFTPM level, petitioners had argued that it would be difficult for the best
batteries to meet the prescribed limits and almost impossible for the older ones to do so. Id.
Petitioners had also claimed that the data was invalid because it did not take into account
varying climatic conditions which affect coke oven batteries. Id.
The court, however, did not agree that the Fairfield data would not reflect industry capabil-
ity since it found that the Fairfield tests, and similar tests performed elsewhere, provided "a
sufficient basis for the Secretary's reasoned belief that the 0.15 mg /m3 limit could be met". Id.
at 834.
48. Id. at 833. According to expert testimony, major new developments in coke production
take a minimum of 10 years to implement. Id.
49. Id.
50. id.
51. Id. at 834-35.
52. Id. at 835. Mindful of the substantial evidence requirement, the Secretary, in develop-
ing standards, employs a number of procedural techniques characteristic of formal rulemaking in
order to provide a reviewable record. See 499 F.2d at 467, 474. For example, when a hearing is
held on objections to proposed rulemaking, cross-examination is permitted, and a verbatim
transcript is maintained. 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15 (1977). In the principal case, the Secretary relied
upon tests at Fairfield, Alabama, and five other coke plants, and contracted with a consulting
firm which concluded that the proposed controls were technologically feasible. 577 F.2d at 834,
835 n.8a.
53. 577 F.2d at 837.
54. The Secretary had contracted with a consulting firm to analyze the financial impact on
the industry. Id. at 836. He also relied on a study commissioned by the AISI. Id. Estimates of
the total annual cost to the coke industry ranged from $240,000,000 to $1,280,000,000. Id.
OSHA's inflationary impact statement estimated a decline of 13% in earnings per share in the
industry as a result of compliance with the standard. Id.
55. See note 24 supra.
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that the limit implemented by the Secretary would not cause the "massive
dislocation" characteristic of an economically infeasible standard. 56
Having upheld the validity of the permissible emissions exposure limit,
the Third Circuit turned to the other challenged aspects of the coke oven
standard. 57  Petitioners' argument that the Secretary had no authority to
impose a "double-barrelled" standard which combined a performance re-
quirement with specifically mandated practices and controls was held to be
without support either in the language of the statute or in prior cases.5 8 The
court, however, invalidated the provision in the standard requiring
employers to "research, develop and implement any other engineering and
work practice controls necessary to reduce exposure to or below the permis-
sible exposure limit" if, after implementing the required controls, that expo-
sure limit had not been met.5 9  In so doing, the court adopted petitioners'
argument that the Act did not authorize a requirement to engage in unlim-
ited research and development 60 and rejected the Government's claim that
the requirement was valid "technology-forcing."61 Although the court had
held in Brennan 62 that an OSHA standard could be based upon technology
that was not yet fully developed, 63 it declined in the instant case to interpret
the Act as authorizing the Secretary to require that employers research and
develop new technology. 64
Finally, the court found that the various mandated controls challenged
by petitioners were supported by substantial evidence,6 5 and that the pro-
posed standard gave petitioners sufficient notice of the controls and proce-
56. 577 F.2d at 836. Noting that an economically infeasible standard would have a serious
impact upon the intervenor, United Steelworkers of America, and its membership, the court
attached significance to the union's strong support for the coke oven standard. Id.
57. 577 F.2d at 837.
58. Id. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act states that "whenever practicable, the standard promul-
gated shall be in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired." 29 U.S.C. §
655(b)(5) (1976). Section 6(b)(7) states that "where appropriate, such standard shall also prescribe
... control or technological procedures." id. § 655(b)(7). The court noted that petitioners had
argued that setting specific engineering controls under § 6(b)(7) as a requirement for meeting a
performance standard under § 6(b)(5) was inappropriate because "[s]etting forth inflexible re-
quirements of particular methods would be effective only if the Secretary could anticipate all
possible problems and devise a uniform approach appropriate to each." 577 F.2d at 837, quoting
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court found nothing in the
language of § 6(b)(5) or § 6(b)(7) which demonstrated that the Secretary had no power to com-
bine a performance standard with controls and procedures. 577 F.2d at 837. Second, the court
found petitioners' reliance on Hodgson misleading because the Hodgson court upheld a standard
in which the Secretary combined a maximum permissible exposure level with certain required
work practices. Id. Third, the court stated that it would defeat the statutory purpose of protect-
ing employee health to bar the use of reasonable controls to achieve that purpose. Id.
59. 577 F.2d at 838. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(f)(1)(i)(b), (f)(1)(ii)(b), (f)(1)(iii)(b), (f)(6)(iii)
(1977). See note 5 supra.
60. See 577 F.2d at 838.
61. See id.
62. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
63. 530 F.2d at 121. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
64. 577 F.2d at 838. The court thus found it unnecessary to reach petitioners' argument that
the requirement was fatally vague. Id.
65. Id. at 839.
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dures required in the standard. 6 6  Accordingly, the court denied the
petitions for review and affirmed the coke oven emissions standard with ex-
ceptions. 6
7
AISI was the first case to test the coke oven emissions standard, but was
the fourth of four major challenges to permanent OSHA standards regarding
toxic substances which substantially vindicated the Secretary's actions. 68  In
upholding the permissible exposure limit and the various mandated controls,
the court's application of a deferential, rational basis test to policy judgments
and insistence upon substantial evidence to support factual determinations
was clearly in accord with the prior cases. 69  Furthermore, the court's ap-
proval of the "double-barrelled" approach of combining a performance stan-
dard with specific required controls 70 is fully supported by the language of
the statute. 7 '
It is submitted that the most significant aspect of the AISI decision was
the invalidation of the requirement to research, develop, and implement
new technology if the permissible exposure limit could not otherwise be
met. 72 The court, however, did not cite the statutory provisions which
would possibly support the Secretary's position on this issue 73 and did not
66. Id. at 839-40.
67. Id. at 840-41. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra.
68. See Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975) (vinyl chloride); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d
1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (ethyleneimine); AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (asbestos dust). In Hodgson, the court affirmed the asbestos
standard but remanded for reexamination of the uniform application of the effective date and
the retention period for monitoring records. 499 F.2d at 488. In SOCMA I, the ethyleneimine
standard was affirmed, but the provision relating to research laboratories was vacated and re-
manded due to a notice problem. 503 F.2d at 1160.
69. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
70. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. Dr. Eula Bingham, Assistant Secretary of
Labor for OSHA, told a meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety
and Health that the coke oven standard was the only one to embody control technology. 361
EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 3 (April 11, 1978). She said that the work was done
by the United Steelworkers union and added that technology development should not be a
government function. Id.
71. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 59-64 and accompanying text supra.
73. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act requires that the Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing
with toxic materials, consider the latest scientific data in the field and that such standards "be
based upon research, demonstration, experiments, and such other information as may be ap-
propriate." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). This was noted by the court. 577 F.2d at 838. How-
ever, the court also might have noted that the purpose of the Act is to try to assure safe and
healthful working conditions
(1) by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of
occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate
employers and employees to institute new and to perfect existing programs for providing
safe and healthful working conditions;
(5) by providing for research in the field of occupational safety and health, including
the psychological factors involved, and by developing innovative methods, techniques,
and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems; ...
29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). The counterargument to the use of the above provision to support
1978-19791
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meaningfully distinguish the instant case from Society of Plastics. Such a
distinction would have been apposite here since there is language in Society
of Plastics which seems to interpret the Act as authorizing the Secretary to
engage in open ended "technology-forcing." 74  Though there are some dif-
ferences between the vinyl chloride standard involved in Society of Plastics
and the AISI coke oven emissions standard, 75 the vinyl chloride standard
certainly contemplated the development of new technology by industry to
meet the exposure limit, 76 and, in establishing the coke oven standard, the
Secretary relied heavily upon the Society of Plastics holding. 77 It should be
noted, however, that the Third Circuit's position on the "technology-forcing"
issue may be consistent with a narrow reading of Society of Plastics that
views the latter's technology-forcing mandate as dicta. 78
open-ended technology-forcing is that the Act gave the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare the authority and responsibility to conduct research in the area of occupational health,
id. § 669, and established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to carry out
that function. Id. § 671. See BRIEF FOR ALL PETITIONERS OTHER THAN REPUBLIC STEEL
CORPORATION AND CF&I STEEL CORPORATION at 25-26, American Iron and Steel Inst. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
74. See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra. In Society of Plastics, Justice Clark
stated that the Secretary "may raise standards which require improvements in existing
technologies or which require the development of new technology, and he is not limited to
issuing standards based solely on devices already fully developed." 509 F.2d at 1309 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
75. The vinyl chloride standard prescribed an exposure limit of 1 ppm averaged over any
eight hour period. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(c) (1977). "Feasible engineering and work practice
controls" were required to be implemented immediately and to be supplemented as necessary
by the use of respirators in reducing exposure to at or below the prescribed limit. Id. §
1910.1017(f)(1)-(2). The vinyl chloride standard, however, contains no provision specifically re-
quiring the development of new technology where necessary, as does the coke oven standard.
Id. § 1910.1029(f)(1)(i)(b). See 577 F.2d at 830.
76. See 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890, 35,892 (1974). In his statement of reasons which accompanied
promulgation of the vinyl chloride standard, the Secretary stated:
We agree that the PVC and VC establishments will not be able to attain a 1 ppm
TWA level for all job classifications in the near future. We do believe, however, that they
will, in time, be able to attain levels of 1 ppm TWA for most job classifications most of
the time. It is apparent that reaching such levels may require some new technology and
work practices. It may also be necessary to utilize technology presently used in other
industries.
Id.
77. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742, 46,756 (1976).
78. See 509 F.2d at 1309. The language in Society of Plastics would seem to approve of
open-ended technology-forcing by OSHA. See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra. This
language may have been dicta, however, since the court, in upholding the vinyl chloride stan-
dard, stressed existing techniques and the use of respirators without further mention of any
need for innovation. 509 F.2d at 1309-10. The Third Circuit in Brennan agreed with the Second
Circuit "that, at least to a limited extent, OSHA is to be viewed as a technology-forcing piece of
legislation." 530 F.2d at 121 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In Brennan, the Secretary
had rejected an alternative to a proposed safety standard. 530 F.2d at 118. The court stated that
the Secretary could not dismiss such an alternative as infeasible "when the necessary technology
looms on today's horizon." Id. at 121. The AISI court applied the corollary of the Brennan
position by holding that a standard which required the implementation of technology "looming
on today's horizon" could be feasible. 577 F.2d at 838.
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It is also submitted that the court did not adequately explain its finding
that OSHA's mandate requiring employers to research and develop new
technology 79 was impermissible under the Act.80 It did not state whether it
interpreted the Act as so restricting the Secretary's power, or whether it
considered the grant of such power to require unambiguous expression of
congressional intent. It may be significant that the court expressly rejected
the opportunity to invalidate this provision on the more narrow grounds of
vagueness. 81
The immediate and most significant impact of AISI derives from the fact
that it upheld the coke oven emissions standard. s2  The decision also con-
tinues the trend of the federal appellate courts of subjecting the Secretary's
factual determinations to the substantial evidence test while affording greater
deference to the quasi-legislative aspects of his decisions.8 3 The AISI deci-
sion should thus strengthen OSHA's position in the difficult task of formulat-
ing health standards 84 and notify affected industries of the extent of OSHA's
authority.85
In striking down the open ended research and development provisions,
the AISI court created a possible conflict between the Second and Third
Circuits.8 6  Furthermore, the limitations imposed by the Third Circuit on
79. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
80. 577 F.2d at 838. See notes 59-64 andaccompanying text supra. "Moreover." the AISI
court added, "the speculative nature of the researcn and development provisions renders any
assessment of feasibility practically impossible." 577 F.2d at 838. The Secretary has admitted
that "some employers who implement all of the required engineering controls and work prac-
tices may have to expend additional funds to research, develop, and implement new technology
in order to meet the permissible exposure limit. Cost figures for these elements are too specula-
tive to estimate." 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742, 46,749 (1976).
81. 577 F.2d at 838. The standard required that, if the exposure limit could not be met using
existing technology, "employers shall research, develop, and implement any other engineering
and work practice controls necessary to reduce exposure to or below the permissible limit ex-
cept to the extent that the employer can establish that such controls are not feasible." 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1029(f)(1)(i)(b), (f)(1)(ii)(b), (f)(1)(iii)(b) (1977). Employers were also required to
"develop a detailed written program and schedule for the development and implementation of
any additional engineering controls and work practices necessary to reduce exposure to or below
the permissible exposure limit." Id. § 1910.1029 (f)(6)(iii). Petitioners argued that this gave
inidvidual employers no indication of the scope of the program they would have to undertake or
of the deadline they would have to meet, and that it provided no guidance to the OSHA
regional offices that would be called upon to enforce the requirement. BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION at 53-56, American Iron and Steel Inst. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
82. Union safety specialists called it "the biggest victory for labor since the courts upheld
the Occupational Safety & Health Administration's vinyl chloride standard a few years ago."
AFL-CIO NEWS, April 8, 1978, at 2.
83. See notes 30-43 and accompanying text supra.
84. It has been argued that heavy criticism of OSHA from both labor and management
suggests not that OSHA must be doing something right, but that it is doing nothing right. Page
& Munsing, Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The Wages Are Still Bitter, 38
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 651, 667 (1974).
85. Lack of industry initiative may be a significant factor when OSHA standards are chal-
lenged: "Indeed, the record shows what can only be described as a course of continued procras-
tination on the part of the iridustry to protect the lives of its employees." Society of the Plastics
Indus. v. OSHW, 509 F.2d 1301, 1305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
86. See notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
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OSHA's technology-forcing power may jeopardize the protection of the
workplace from newly discovered hazards.8 7 Moreover, although differences
in subject matter, legislative purpose, and statutory language may render
any comparison between the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the
Clean Air Act somewhat tenuous,88 it should be noted that the United States
Supreme Court has rejected the Third Circuit's position on the technology-
forcing character of the Clean Air Act, which had restrictive implications
similar to the AISI holding.8 9
In view of the vagueness of the technology-forcing provisions in the
coke oven standard and the effectiveness of existing technology in dealing
with the hazards to coke oven employees, the AISI court's position seems
justifiable in the instant case. Whether it will survive more compelling cir-
cumstances remains to be seen.
John Stemplewicz
87. As stated in the legislative history of the Act: "It is estimated that every 20 minutes a
new and potentially toxic chemical is introduced into industry. New processes and new sources
of energy present occupational health problems of unprecedented complexity." S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178.
88. Unlike the Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976), the Clean
Air Act contains no express requirement of feasibility in the sections providing for the promul-
gation of ambient air standards and the approval of state plans to meet those standards. 42
U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (1970).
89. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). In that case, the Court held that the
Administrator of the EPA may not consider claims of technological or economic infeasibility in
evaluating state plans for meeting primary ambient air quality standards, and, therefore, that a
court reviewing an approved plan cannot set it aside on those grounds. Id. at 265-66. The Third
Circuit's position on that issue had been to the contrary. See Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522
F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 427 U.S. 902 (1976); St. Joe Minerals Corp.
v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 987 (1976); Duquesne
Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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